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Conflicting Custody Decrees:
In Whose Best Interest?
In the little world in which children have their existence, whoso-
ever brings them up, there is nothing so finely perceived and so
finely felt, as injustice.'
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary legal thought has thus far grappeled unsuccessfully
with the problems presented by foreign child custody decrees. Ease of
mobility and the transient nature of today's society have compounded
the difficulties which arise from conflicts between states attempting to
apply their laws to best serve the needs of their citizens. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause2 providing for recognition of foreign judgments has
not been considered applicable to amendable decrees,3 thus resulting in
further confusion. The question of what constitutes proper jurisdiction
to decide custody cases cannot be answered uniformly in all states. While
certainly the high interest which each state must place upon protecting
the children within its boundaries should not be diminished by its at-
tempts to cooperate with its neighboring states, neither must the child's
welfare be subject to states attempting to exercise their jurisdiction
when it is not justified, in order to protect their sovereignty or insure
the dignity of their courts.4 The challenge facing the courts is to achieve
1. C. DICKENS, GREAT EXPECTATIONS 62 (1860-1861).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
3. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). It is arguable that the
question is unsettled since the Court reserved decision on several specific issues raised
in Halvey. But the decision has generally been interpreted as holding that custody de-
crees are entitled to only that credit which would be accorded in a subsequent proceeding
in the state rendering the original decree. See Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1949); Comment, Custody Decrees
-Full Faith and Credit, 2 ARK. L. REV. 78 (1947); Note, Child Custody Decrees-Inter-
state Recognition, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1178 (1964).
4. In the assertion of rights, defined by one state, within the territory of another,
there is often an inescapable conflict of interest of the two states, and there comes
a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders
involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the other.
Stumberg, The Status of Children in The Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 26, 57
(1940).
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the proper method of reaching their own stated goal of providing for
the "best interests of the child."
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a contempt cita-
tion issued against a father who removed himself and his children from
the jurisdiction of the lower court, refusing to comply with an order
awarding custody of the children to the mother.5 The father, in Brocker
v. Brocker,6 elected to seek a custody award in the courts of Ohio where
he had earlier become a resident and where the children were tempo-
rarily residing. It is unfortunate that an earlier hearing date was not
scheduled particularly in view of the father's allegations, as the court's
decision must have appeared to the father to indicate a lack of faith in
the seriousness of his contentions. It is highly probable that the father
would have submitted to its jurisdiction had the lower court in Penn-
sylvania been more prompt in granting the hearing requested. What-
ever may be said of the wisdom of the Ohio court's decision to intercede,
Brocker solved his quandry by appealing to that forum, obtaining a
temporary order and insuring the custody of the children to him until
further court determination.7
There are innumerable cases in which courts are asked to decide the
question of proper custody of children when the basis of their jurisdic-
tion to do so may be in doubt. Pending resolution of these issues,
uniformity of decision aimed at promoting the best interest of the
child cannot be achieved.
THE NATURE OF CUSTODY
Custody is a concept which courts and text writers have found diffi-
cult to define. "In its broadest sense custody refers to the relationship
5. Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1969).
6. Id. Appellant and his wife were divorced in October, 1964. Both were residents of
Pennsylvania at the time and were personally before the Court. The order incorporated
a custody award of the children to the mother, and an agreement of the parties to sub-
mit to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court regardless of the residence or domicile
of the parties or their children. In June, 1965, the order was amended to permit the
father to take the children to Ohio for the summer. They were to be returned five days
prior to the beginning of the fall school term. On August 5, 1965, the father petitioned
for a modification of the order, alleging the unfitness of the mother and requesting
permanent custody. A hearing was set for October 11, 1965, more than a month after
the beginning of the school term. The father then instituted proceedings in Ohio seeking
a temporary order for custody pending a final determination. On August 5, 1965, the
mother requested that the father be held in contempt for his failure to return the
children on August 25, per the June, 1965, order. At a hearing on September 6, 1965, a
contempt citation was issued against the father.
7. Ct. of C. P., Div. Dom. Rel., Juv. Div., Mahoning Co., Ohio (Sept. 12, 1966).
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which exists between parents and a child in a normal going family.",.
Early authorities considered "custody" a right of the parent incident to
his responsibility to nurture and care for the child. At common law the
father was entitled to custody, earnings and services which grew out of
his obligations to maintain and educate his children.9 Gradually the
emphasis has shifted to focus on the "best interests of the child" and the
responsibility of the state to further that "interest."
Historically, jurisdiction to decide custody cases has rested in courts
of Equity. Authorities are in dispute as to whether jurisdiction is based
upon the obligation of the King to protect and defend his subjects or
the notion that a guardianship is a form of trust and therefore the pe-
culiar object of equity.'0 Early cases generally involved the appointment
of a third person as guardian for a child who had no parents. More re-
cently, the increase in the number of divorces granted and the custom
of providing for maintenance and custody as a part of the decree has
resulted in an expansion of the jurisdiction so as to include controver-
sies between parents over custody of their children. Divorce statutes in
all states now authorize custody awards as an incident of the divorce
decree and some courts have preceeded to a custody determination even
though the divorce was denied." Most states also provide for petitions
in equity or statutory proceedings relating to dependent or neglected
children as methods of determining a custody controversy. 12 Actions un-
der these latter statutes often arise from allegations that neither parent
is fit to have custody of the child and the court must decide not only
between parents, but also whether the child's best interest might not
be benefitted by placement with a third party. This type of decision
encompasses factors beyond the scope of this inquiry and for the present
only controversies between parents will be discussed.
Consideration of the factors involved in a court's decision to place a
child with one parent or the other is essential. 13 In order to achieve
8. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 573 (1968).
9. STRAUSS AND ROME, THE CHILD AND THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA 1 (1943).
10. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EqurrY JURISPRUDENCE 578 (12th ed. 1877), where
the author states that ". . . it will scarcely be controverted, that in every civilized state,
such a superintendence and protective power does somewhere exist."
11. CLARK, supra note 8, at 576 & n.3.
12. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1871 et seq. (1967); OHIO STAT. ANN. tit. 27,§ 2725.01 et seq. (1953).
13. For a detailed discussion, see CLARK, supra note 8; STRAUSS AND ROME, supra note
9; R. LEVY, SELECTED MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW; CUSTODY, THE UNWED MOTHER, ADOP-
TION, PARENTAL NEGLECT (1964); ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON FAMILY LAW (1950); Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague and Indefinite
Standards, 5 J. FAMILY L. 21 (1965).
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some sense of uniformity, it is necessary to define certain general factors
which should be considered to some degree in every case presented. The
factors considered in granting a custody award can be broadly broken
down into four categories: the age and sex of the child; the child's pref-
erence; financial and religious considerations; and moral considerations.
Admittedly, these four factors are as interrelated as the many elements
which combine in a given situation to prove their existence, but they
do function as guidlines for a court faced with the difficult decision of
making a custody award.
Many courts, when considering the age and sex of the child, have
been led to invoke what they have termed the "tender years" doctrine.1 4
Whenever a child is of tender years it is deemed prima facia evidence
that the mother is entitled to custody.15 This is especially true when the
child is a girl.' However, when it is shown that custody by the mother
would not be consistent with the child's best interest and welfare the
presumption in favor of the mother may be rebutted.17
Most authorities doubtlessly would agree that at some point the
wishes and preferences of the child must be considered in determining
custody.'8 Factors such as the child's age, his intelligence and his matur-
ity 1 9 must be examined. The child's preference should be based on le-
gitimate reasons and not upon whim or fancy or a desire to avoid pa-
rental control.20
Religious and economic factors are also important in custody deter-
minations, but they are generally only an aspect of what constitutes the
child's best interests. 2' The courts have refused to enforce agreements
between parents regarding the raising of a child in a particular reli-
gious faith and have held it is more consistent with the best interests of
14. Note, Measuring the Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete Considerations,
44 DENVER L.J. 132 (1962); 1 J. FAMILY L. 138 (1961), and cases cited therein.
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. 403, 205
A.2d 49 (1964).
16. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Horton v. Burke, 190 Pa. Super. 392, 154 A.2d
255 (1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Shipps v. Shipps, 209 Pa. Super. 58, 223 A.2d 906
(1966).
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex tel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa. Super. 339, 195 A.2d 878
(1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Oliver v. Oliver, 165 Pa. Super. 593, 69 A.2d 445 (1945);
Commonwealth ex tel. Logue v. Logue, 194 Pa. Super. 210, 166 A.2d 60 (1960).
18. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 8; J. SCHOULER, LAW OF DoMmrSc RELATIONS (1905);
OSTER, supra note 13.
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Weber v. Miller, 84 Pa. Super. 409 (1925).
20. CLARK, supra note 8; STRAuss & ROME, supra note 9.
21.. Note, Religious Consideration in Awarding Custody of Children, 61 DIcK. L. REV.
87 (1956); Note, Religion-A Factor in Awarding Custody of Infants?, 31 S. CAL. L. REv.
313 (1958).
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the child that he should observe the faith of the parent in whose cus-
tody he has been placed. 22 In like manner, the material and financial
benefits which a child may derive from being placed with one parent
rather than the other are considered as a part of the general welfare
of the child.23
The moral fitness of each parent must also be weighed by the court
in relation to its effect upon the child.2 4 Evidence of unfitness consists
of such factors as a parent's emotional instability, frequent immoral
acts, or failure to provide adequate parental care and guidance during
periods in which the child has been under the parent's control.2 5-
In the final analysis, the correctness or incorrectness of any custody
award must rest upon the wisdom of the individual judge making the
award. Only to the extent that he is able to untangle the conflicting
testimony and isolate the truth from emotion-laden responses will the
child's best interests be served. The system is one of conflict, and it is
a wise judge who is able to maintain his perspective and control his
own feelings when confronted with zealous attorneys, adamant parents
and heartbroken children.
JURISDICTION AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Jurisdiction
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws28 demonstrates that as recently
as 1934 American authorities still accepted the English notion that cus-
tody is a status and jurisdiction to determine custody is dependent upon
the domicile of the person. Fixed definitions of domicile were prescribed
depending upon the possible physical locations of the child and the re-
lationship existing between the parents. 27 The test was mechanical and
easy to apply in most cases, probably because of the lack of mobility of
citizens between states, and the incomplete evolution of the concept of
the child's "best interest" as being more pervasive than "status" in de-
22. 57 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1957); 59 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1959).
-23. See Oster, supra note 13.
24. CLARK, supra note 8; STRAuss & ROME, supra note 9; 20 MD. L. REv. 138 (1960).
25. 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 287 (1959); 28 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 138 (1955).
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934), [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT]. "A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to determine the custody of
children or to create the status of guardian of the person only if the domicil of the
person placed under custody or guardianship is within the state."
27. RESTATEMENT § 32. "The minor child's domicil, in the case of divorce or judicial
separation of its parents, is that of the parent to whose custody it has been legally given;
if -there has been no legal fixing of custody, its domicil is that of the parent with whom
it lives, but if it lives with neither, it retains the father's domicil."
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termining jurisdiction. Story's work on Conflict. of Laws28 also-serves
to point out the early tendency to emphasize the child's domicile, as the
basis for jurisdiction. Although Story does not deal directly with the
concept of custody as embraced by the Restatement, his discussion of
guardianship 29 aptly illustrates the domicile emphasis. Beale,3 0 whose
treatise was introduced contemporaneously with the Restatement, essen-
tially followed the Restatement definition of domicile. However, Beale's
definition would seem to be somewhat more stringent in that it fixes the
minor child's domicile as that of the father regardless of the actual fact
of the child's residence.3'
While adhering to the orthodox view of domicile as the basis of ju-
risdiction, the Restatement apparently perceived that difficulties may
arise from a strict application of the domicile doctrine, for Section 14832
can be interpreted as suggesting that mere presence in the state provides
a basis for jurisdiction if a "custodian" is found unfit.33
Regardless of how the Restatement is interpreted, it is evident that
by the time it was formulated courts had recognized that the "best inter-
est" of the child, rather than the "status" of the parent-child relation-
ship, should govern a determination to exercise its jurisdiction.34 How-
ever, since in cases of separation or divorce of the parents where custody
of the child has not been legally fixed, the child's domicile, according
to the Restatement,3 5 is that of the parent with whom he lives, i.e. his
presence, the results obtained under a "best interests" analysis have not
appeared to be a radical departure from prior decisions.
28. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1852).
29. Id. at § 492.
30. J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30.1 (1935). "A legitimate infant
whose father is alive at birth, and continues during minority, the domicil of his father,
following that domicil as it changes; and is necessarily referred to that domicile without
regard to the actual facts of his residence.
31. Id.
32. RESTATEMENT § 148. "In any state into which the child comes, upon proof that
the custodian of the child is unfit to have control of the child, the child may be taken
from him and given while in the state to another person."
33. RESTATEMENT, Explanatory Note § 148, comment a at 213, implies that no extra-
territorial effect will be accorded such a custody award. It states, "This action will be
effective within the state. If the state is also the state of domicil of the child, the action
will change the status and will therefore be effective in every state."
34. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925), provides as follows:
The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants found within its terri-
tory does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the pro-
tection that is due to the incompetent or helpless. . . . For this, the residence of the
child suffices though the domicile be elsewhere. . . . But the limits of the jurisdiction
are suggested by its origin. The residence of the child may not be used as a pre-
tense for the adjudication of the status whose domicile is elsewhere, nor for the
definition of parental rights dependent upon status. . ..
35. RESTATEMENT § 32.
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Full Faith and Credit
While most courts today would find presence of the child within their
jurisdiction sufficient to act to protect his best interest,3 the question of
recognition of foreign custody decrees is still unsettled.37 Both the Re-
statement3 8 and Professor Beale 39 take the position that once custody
has been awarded by the proper court the award will be recognized and
enforced by other states. But, such recognition is limited to facts adjudi-
cated at the time of the original decree. 40 Stansbury, 1 surveying the
problem in 1944, asserted that while in the cases which he reviewed the
courts declared themselves bound by prior determinations, in less than
half was the foreign decree enforced.42 The study further demonstrated
the growing majority of cases in which the courts felt free to disregard
the prior award on grounds that "a material change of circumstances
was found to have occurred since the foreign decree was rendered and
those in which the court considered itself free to examine the merits
because of an asserted jurisdictional defect or for some other reason. ' ' 43
In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,44 the United States Supreme
Court was asked to decide the full faith and credit issue. Confronted
with a New York custody award granted after a determination of cus-
tody had previously been made by a Florida court, the Supreme Court
found that: the Florida decree was not irrevocable and unchangeable;
36. In RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (Proposed Official Draft, May
2, 1967) this position has been taken:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to determine the custody, or appoint
a guardian, of the person of a child or adult
(a) who is domiciled in the state, or
(b) who is present in the state, or
(c) who is neither domiciled nor present in the state, if the controversy is between
two or more persons who are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
See also A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 281 (1962); and H. GOOD-
RICH & E. SCOLES, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 271 (4th ed. 1962).
37. 49 IowA L. REV. 1178, 1.182 (1964); 80 U. PA. L. REV. 712 (1932); Stumberg,
supra note 4.
38. RESTATEMENT § 147. "Except as stated in § 148 [see footnote 32 supra] when the
custody of a child has been awarded by the proper court to either parent, the decree will
be enforced in other states."
39. BEALE, supra note 30, at § 147.1 (1935). When the custody of a child has been
awarded to one parent by a court having jurisdiction so to do, the right of this
parent will be recognized by other states .... But this estoppel extends only to con-
ditions which existed at the time of the original decree; the second court may ex-
amine any facts which have occurred since the original decree which throw light
upon the fitness of the parents to have custody of the child.
40. Id.; RESTATEMENT § 147 comment a at 212.
41.' Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB., 818 (1944).
42. Id. at 828.
43. Id. at 830.
44. 30 U.S. 610 (1946).
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that the Florida courts had the power to modify it where conditions
were shown to be altered; that Florida custody decrees were not res judi-
cata in Florida or elsewhere except as to facts before the court at the
time of the judgment. The Court held that "so far as the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is concerned, what Flordia could do in modifying the
decree, New York may do."'45 The Supreme Court specifically reserved
decision on questions raised as to Flordia's jurisdiction to award the
initial decree; whether New York's power to modify the decree was
greater than Florida's; or "whether the State which has jurisdiction over
the child may, regardless of a custody decree rendered by another State,
make such orders concerning custody as the welfare of the child from
time to time requires." 46
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, objected to the "technical" dis-
tinction of finality of judgments which the majority implied con-
trolled the applicability of full faith and credit protection. 47 He pre-
ferred a more realistic test which looked to providing a solution to the
conflicts which arise out of family relationships. In the absence of
"changed circumstances affecting the welfare of the child which called
for a change in custodial care," Frankfurter maintained that New York
would have to respect the Flordia decree so long as "there was legal
power in the Flordia Court to enter the custodial decree."48
Mr. Justice Rutledge, also concurring, agreed with the "lack of final-
.ity" issue held conclusive by the majority, but pointed out that the
"distressing result" may make possible a "continuing round of litiga-
tion over custody, perhaps also of abduction, between alienated par-
ents."4 9
Since Halvey, the United States Supreme Court has issued only three
other opinions directed toward answering problems arising out of fact
situations similar to Halvey. May v. Anderson5O involved a father who
attempted to enforce in Ohio a Wisconsin custody decree incident to
an ex parte divorce granted while neither the mother nor the children
were in Wisconsin. The Court held that Ohio was not required to give
full faith and credit to the Wisconsin decree. The decision was based
45. Id. at 614. "[A] judgment has no more constitutional claim to a more conclusive
or final effect in the State of the forum than it has in the State where rendered."
46. Id. at 616.
47. Id. at 618.
48. Id. at 619.
49. Id.
50. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). See also Hazard, May v. Anderson, Preamble to-Family Law
Chaos, 45 VA. L. REv. 379 (1959); 15 U. Pirr L. Rav. 163 (1953).
269
Duquesne Law Review
upon the premise that regradless of the domicile of the children, Wis-
consin did not have the requisite personal jurisdiction over the mother
necessary to deprive her of her personal right to possession of her chil-
dren. The rationale, unfortunately, is inconsistent with the concept of
the child's "best interest" as providing a basis for the exercise of juris-
diction. It is reflective of the type of reasoning which might have been
expected under the earlier "status" doctrine, and is a departure from
the trend which the Court indicated in Halvey.
No doubt, in view of their experience with May v. Anderson,5 the
Ohio court felt somewhat compelled to exercise jurisdiction when con-
fronted with Brocker v. Brocker.52 Mere presence of the children within
the state's boundaries demanded that Ohio act to protect the children's
"best interests." But, it is questionable whether the confusiof which
resulted from the Ohio court's decision to exercise jurisdiction could
have been avoided under the present rule or whether the best interests
of the children have actually been served.
In Kovocks v. Brewer,53 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
North Carolina courts "for clarification, and, if they have not already
decided, so they may have an opportunity to determine the issue of
changed circumstances."54 The problem arose when a mother sought
to enforce in North Carolina a New York decree which modified an
earlier New York decree. When the first decree was rendered, all of
the parties were before the court and custody of the child was granted
to the paternal grandfather, a resident of North Carolina. Nearly four
years later, the mother asked the New York court to amend the order
and award custody of the child to her, which they did. North Carolina
refused to give the decree effect in that state and, upon independent
investigation, found that it would be in the best interest of the child if
she were to remain with her grandfather. The United States Supreme
Court reserved opinion upon the question of New York's jurisdiction
to amend the decree and seemingly applied the rule which Frankfurter
had suggested in his concurring opinion in Halvey.55 However, Frank-
furter dissented in this opinion, expressing the view that the constitu-
tional command of full faith and credit does not apply to custody de-
crees, impliedly abandoning his earlier opinion that some form of full
51. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
52. Ct. of C.P., Div. Doam. Rel., Juv. Div., Mahoning Co., Ohio (Sept. 12, 1966).
53. 356 U.S. 604 (1958); discussed in 44 A.B.A.J. 772 (1958).
.54. 356. U.S. at 608.
55. 330 U.S. at 619.
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faith and credit is required in the absence of "changed circumstances. '5
The next case to reach the Court was Ford v. Ford.57 .The problem
arose when the mother sought full custody of her children in South
Carolina. Previously, a Virginia court had dismissed a habeas corpus
petition by the father when the parties reached an agreement as to the
custody of the children. The Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that since a judgment entered in a Virginia court by consent or agree-
ment would be res judicata in Virginia, it is res judicata and entitled
to full faith and credit in South Carolina. Once again, the United
States Supreme Court-reserved decision on whether the South'Carolina
court's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was correct.
The case was remanded for a determination of "changed circum-
stances" on grounds that South Carolina's interpretation that the judg-
ment was res judicata in Virginia was incorrect and therefore no full
faith and credit issue could arise.
In light of the preceding analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions,
any attempt to set down a hard and fast rule as to the applicability of
full faith and credit to foreign custody decrees would be speculative.
Regardless of the rule, it seems apparent that states would have little
difficulty in circumventing the application of full faith and credit by
basing their decisions to disregard the prior decree upon a "change of
circumstances."5 8
ANALYSIS
It seems apparent that to date the courts and text writers alike, al-
though ably illuminating the problem, have grappled with the solution
somewhat unsuccessfully.. The question might be asked: who should lay
down the rule and what should the rule be?
It seems unlikely that Congress will act to establish a standard to
guide the states in deciding the extraterritorial effect to be given custody
decrees. While the Full Faith and Credit Clause59 provides that Con-
gress may enact legislation in implementation thereof, Congress has
56. 356 U.S. at 614. Compare Kovacks v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958), with May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
57. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
58. STUMBERG, supra note 4, at 57. "[U]nfortunately, the term 'change of conditions' is
sufficiently broad to make it possible for a court to escape what it might otherwise
feel to be an obligation to recognize an earlier award as still effective through resort to
the simple expedient of requiring little evidence of change."
59. US. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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generally been content merely to restate the rule and defer to the Court's
interpretation of the Clause.60 Admitting that such legislation falls
within the authority of Congress, the particular nature of the problem
might dictate the wisdom of their decision to refrain from acting in an
area so inherently related to local internal policy of the states.
State courts have exhibited little uniformity in arriving at a rule as
,to jurisdiction initially or to the effect they will give prior extraterrito-
rial decrees.61 Some courts may well have used the "best interests" of
the child as a basis for exercising a jurisdiction which is not in the "best
interests" of the child at all. The problem presented in Brocker cer-
tainly suggests that the Pennsylvania court, because of its past associa-
tion with the parties and its geographic accessibility to information
necessary for resolution of the specific issues, was in a superior position
to determine the validity of the father's allegations which supposedly
constituted "changed circumstances." In view of the fact that the chil-
dren were under an existing order, and therefore, presumably the con-
trol and supervision of one court which stood ready to protect their
interests, the Ohio court's action clearly seem premature.62
At the other extreme, some courts have found themselves in the posi-
tion of having to refuse aid because of a parochial concept of domicile
which deprives them of jurisdiction. 63 Had the Ohio court followed the
domicile doctrine as postulated by the Restatement, they could have
deferred to the Pennsylvania court, achieving what may have been the
more desirable result. However, the limitation of such a technical ap-
proach appears obvious when considered in relation to a fact situation
which demands action to protect children from immediate emotional
or physical harm.
With respect to full faith and credit, a few states, have indicated that
the prior decree is entitled to no effect, while the majority express the
view which the decisions of the Supreme Court infer; that in the ab-
sence of "changed circumstances" a prior decree is res judicata as to
those elements adjudicated at the time of the decree and entitled to full
60. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738-1742 (1964).
61. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. Rav. 345, 349-
352 (1953).
62. See STUMBERG, supra note 4, at 58, suggesting that the disturbing effect implicit in
a resort to new judicial proceedings may be alleviated by requiring convincing proof
that conditions have actually changed..
63. 5 WU.LIAMETTE L.J. 171 (1968).
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faith and credit.6 4 As the cases have illustrated, the results do not neces-
sarily conform to the statement of the rule.
In the so called "legal kidnapping" cases there is a split of opinion as
to whether or not the state into which the child has been brought should
lend its aid to the parent seeking custody. In Brocker the father held
the children in Ohio legally under an existing order but the distinction
is of little significance. His purpose in seeking the aid of the Ohio court
was to avoid what he felt to be an adverse decision. A few courts have
applied the concept of "continuing jurisdiction" combined with the
notion that another state is perhaps in a better position to give equal
justice as a basis for refusing jurisdiction in this type of case.65 The
merit of this position is the flexibility which it offers when combined
with a "changed circumstances" application of full faith and credit. But
if it is rigidly applied in every case, the danger exists that a child who
realistically needs the protection of the court may be deprived thereof.
It is also the practice in some states to require a bond of a parent who
wishes to remove a child from the state.0 6 Under such a requirement it
would seem that the offending parent's presence before the court could
be assured, thus enabling the court by contempt proceedings to obtain
the return of the children. This procedure may have been particularly
applicable in the Brocker case since the Pennsylvania court found itself
with no means of enforcing its contempt citation. However, the avail-
ability of the contempt proceeding as a coercive power rests in all the
states and a situation could conceivably arise in which a litigant under
an order from two states would be unable to conform to the order of
either state without incurring a contempt violation in the opposing
state.
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64. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 246 (1968); EHRENZWEIG, supra note 36, at
291; 49 IOWA L. REV. 1178 (1964).
65. 12 LOYOLA L. REv. 147, 151 (1965). "When two or more state courts exercising
concurrent jurisdiction reach conflicting results, it is suggested that the dominant con-
tacts or substantial interests criteria . . . should be resorted to in order to settle the
conflict. When it is recalled that the child's best interest is the paramount consideration
in custody cases, the problem of conflicting or contradictory judgments loses much of its
significance (emphasis in original)." See also 5 WILLIAMErrE L.J. 171 (1968).
66. This procedure was employed by the New York court to ensure the mother's com-
pliance with their decree. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1946).
67. In many States, intervention by a third party on behalf of a child is authorized.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1871 et seq. (1967); OHIO STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 2725.01
et seq. (1953). In Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968), cert. denied, - U.S.
- (1969). had a third party filed a petition for habeas corpus in Ohio, seeking to restrain
the father from returning the children to the mother, and the Court, acting in the "best
interest" of the children, had issued such an order, the father, in complying with the
Pennsylvania order, would have been in contempt of the Ohio court.
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The best solution is for the United States Supreme Court to squarely
face the issue and establish standards which would lend themselves to
enable the states to resolve their conflicting interests in a manner
compatible with their own, the parents' and the child's best interest.
Since generally, state courts require some "change of circumstances"
before they will amend a prior custody award granted by their own
courts, it should not be too difficult to incorporate the concept totally
into interstate conflict situations. As has been demonstrated, the major-
ity of states have probably already done so. The merit of the "changed
circumstance" rule is the flexibility necessary to allow each state to act
when the child's "best interests" demand, and further, it should provide
the courts with the impetus for an extremely thorough investigation of
all relevant factors thus precluding cursory evaluations and wrong deci-
sions. Ultimately, the conclusion should be reached that the question of
whether a "change of circumstances" has actually occurred can best be
determined by one court rather than the other, depending upon the
type of "change of circumstances" is alleged to have occurred.6 s For
example, in Brocker the "change of circumstances" alleged was the mis-
conduct of the mother who had continuously been a resident of Penn-
sylvania. Clearly the facilities of the Pennsylvania court were more ade-
quate to decide the validity of the father's allegations than those of the
Ohio court.
The necessity exists for the Supreme Court to clearly state that full
faith and credit will be required in the absence of "changed circum-
stance,' and to establish the burden of proof required to show a "change
of circumstance." Because of the ease with..which state courts have
found "changed circumstances" in the past the Supreme Court should'
enunciate a rule which requires clear and convincing proof by the mov-
ing party that an actual change of circumstances has occurred, and that
the aid sought is not an attempt to evade the jurisdiction of another.
state which has the knowledge and investigatory facilities to best decide
what the best interests of the child require. Enunciation of the rule
prescribing full faith and credit and the burden of proof necessary to
establish a "change of circumstances" lies within the traditional func-
tion of the Court. The suggestion that the determination of "changed
68. Stumberg, supra note 4, at 56. "It would seem, then, that demarcation of the lines
which would limit permissible exercise of judicial power in custody proceedings should
. . . be drawn from the point of view of the ability of the. court entertaining them to
make such an investigation of the facts as will eptble it to act for the best interests of
the child."
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circumstances" could more validly be made by one court rather than
another may not fall within this traditional function. It seems to imply
a federal forum non convenience rule which would be binding upon
the states. However, the Court can reach this objective without abdicat-
ing its traditional function by requiring clear and convincing proof,
making it necessary for the moving parent to seek relief in the forum
where proof of "changed circumstances" is most readily accessible. Un-
der this rule, decisions altering prior custody awards, regardless of the
forum, will in reality conform to the concept of the child's "best inter-
est."
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that some form of full faith and credit for foreign cus-
tody awards is necessary to insure the stability of environment so essen-
tial to the well-being of every child confronted with the conflict of di-
vorce. At the same time, flexibility to make adjustments in those cases
where the "best interests" of the child demand a change in custody must
be preserved. But it must be recognized that not all courts stand in an
equal position to decide what is actually in the "best interests" of the
child. Establishing a standard which requires full faith and credit in
the absence of a clear showing of "changed circumstances" should ac-
complish the objectives of stability and flexibility. The strong burden
of proof required should dictate that the state in the best position to
determine the child's "best interests", i.e., whether a "change of cir-
cumstances" has occurred, is the appropriate forum to settle the con-
troversy.
It is the function of the United States Supreme Court to resolve con-
flict among the states. Until the Supreme Court announces the "rule"
and-stands ready to enforce its application, the confusion will continue
to exist. The Court should act now to eliminate this confusion and
stimulate increased cooperation between the states to develop a stable
system of protecting the rights of parents, diminshing conflicts, and
most importanly, best serving the needs of those unfortunate children
affected by the tragedy of parental separation and divorce.
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